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ABSTRACT 
 
Using equity returns for financial institutions we estimate both catastrophic and operational risk 
measures over the period 1973-2001. We find evidence of cyclical components in both the 
catastrophic and operational risk measures obtained from the Generalized Pareto Distribution 
and the Skewed Generalized Error Distribution. Our new, comprehensive approach to measuring 
operational risk shows that approximately two thirds of financial institutions’ returns represents 
compensation for operational risk. 
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 1
Cyclicality in Catastrophic and Operational Risk Measurements 
 
 A natural point of departure for all elements of business risk measurement is the past.  Future 
trends and current metrics are often extrapolated from an historical data series.  However, this process is 
fundamentally flawed if there are cyclical factors that impact business measures of risk or performance.  
Historical data on operational risk gathered during an economic expansion may not be relevant for a 
period of recession.  Estimates of default risk and recovery rates incorporate cyclical components that are 
correlated to systematic risk factors, such as macroeconomic fluctuations and regulatory shifts.  All too 
frequently, however, researchers and practitioners alike ignore these cyclical factors and blithely extend 
an unadjusted trend line into the future.  The metrics obtained using this methodology are fundamentally 
flawed.  By aggregating across different macroeconomic regimes, these historical estimates do not 
accurately reflect either time period.  It is the goal of this paper to demonstrate the importance of 
developing models to adjust for systematic and cyclical risk factors in business metrics. 
 Neglect of cyclical components in business and risk measurement is not the result of an oversight.  
Indeed, currently one of the major impediments to the adoption of the BIS New Capital Accord for 
international bank regulations is the proposal’s neglect of cyclical factors.1  Concerns focus on the 
procyclical nature of credit risk.  That is, if there are systemic cyclicalities in bank risk exposures, for 
example, then aggregate bank capital requirements that are based on risk measurements with significant 
cyclical components may experience cyclical swings that may have unintended, adverse impacts on the 
macroeconomy.    For example, if credit risk models overstate (understate) default risk in bad (good) 
times, then internal bank capital requirements will be set too high (low) in bad (good) times, thereby 
forcing capital-constrained banks to retrench on lending during recessions and expand lending during 
booms.2  Since most banks are subject to the same cyclical fluctuations, the overall macroeconomic effect 
of capital regulations is to exacerbate business cycles, thereby worsening recessions and overheating 
expanding economies – that is, the risk-adjusted capital requirements proposed by the BIS Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision are procyclical.3    
 Academic and business researchers acknowledge the importance of cyclical factors in business 
measures of risk and performance.  In a series of articles, Allen and Saunders (2002a, 2002b) survey the 
                                                          
1 For description of the BIS proposals, see BIS (January 2001, March 2001, September 2001), BIS (March 2002). 
2 Hillegeist et al. (2002) compare accounting-based credit risk measurement models (Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s 
O-score) to the market-based option pricing model of default risk and find that the addition of market factors (in this 
case, equity prices) significantly improves explanatory power, thereby indicating the presence of a systematic 
market risk factor in default probabilities.  Bongini et al. (2002) obtain similar results when comparing accounting 
data, stock prices and credit ratings as indicators of bank fragility. 
3 Of course, prudential supervision could be used to mitigate these systemic factors, as in the case of “ring-fencing,” 
which is the supervisory process of “protecting a bank from adverse impact of events occurring in the wider 
corporate group, especially those engaging in unsupervised activities.”  BIS, March (2002, p. 51). 
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state of the art in adjusting risk measures for macroeconomic factors.   Lowe (2002) suggests that a 
business cycle view would result in recessions following expansions and vice versa in a pattern similar to 
a sine wave.  However, the poor track record of economic forecasting might cast doubts on such a simple 
specification of cyclical effects.  Lowe (2002) acknowledges the difficulties in incorporating more 
complex cyclical models.  Most risk measurement models, therefore, assume that key parameters are 
independent of macroeconomic factors.  This paper tests and rejects that hypothesis. We explicitly test 
whether cyclical risk factors are incorporated into measures of operational risk and catastrophic risk 
exposures in financial institutions.  We find that cyclical factors are significant components of both 
catastrophic and operational risk.  Thus, neglect of cyclicality undermines accuracy in risk measurement. 
Catastrophic risk is estimated using two different methodologies: Extreme Value Theory 
implemented using the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) of Pickands (1975), and a Skewed Fat-
Tailed Distribution implemented using the Skewed Generalized Error Density (SGED) of Bali and 
Theodossiou (2003).  The database is presented and the GPD estimation is described in Section 1, 
whereas the SGED estimation results are contained in Section 2.  The cyclical factors are defined and 
their significance is tested in Section 3.  We limit our attention to catastrophic risk in Sections 1-3.  In 
Section 4, we define a new, residual measure of operational risk that is quite comprehensive.  We utilize 
both the GPD and SGED models to estimate the operational risk measurements.  Evidence of cyclicality 
in these operational risk measurements is examined in Section 5.  Finally, Section 6 concludes and makes 
recommendations for future research. 
 
1. Estimating Catastrophic Risk Using the Generalized Pareto Distribution 
Catastrophic risk events result in extremely low equity returns, as compared to a monthly cross 
section of equity returns. Catastrophic risk may be generated by extreme shifts in interest rates, exchange 
rates, equity prices, commodity prices, credit quality or operational performance.  Thus, catastrophic risk 
contains elements of market risk, credit risk and operational risk.  In this section, we focus on catastrophic 
risk, whatever its source.  Subsequently, in Section 4, we decompose catastrophic risk into its market risk, 
credit risk and operational risk components and analyze the cyclical effects in the operational risk 
(residual) component.  
  
1.1 The Database 
We analyze catastrophic risk using a sample comprised of financial intermediaries.  We limit our 
study of catastrophic risk to financial institutions in order to define a relatively homogenous group of 
firms that have broad risk exposures. Financial intermediaries maintain risk inventories as a normal 
course of conducting business – making markets, underwriting securities and holding portfolios 
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comprised of financial securities.  Thus, we believe that a sample of financial institutions offers the best 
opportunity to observe a wide range of risk exposures, thereby making it possible to decompose 
catastrophic risk into its component parts.   
Although financial intermediaries have similar characteristics, they are not completely 
homogenous.  For example, banks differ somewhat from insurance companies and from broker/dealers.4  
We construct our sample by searching CRSP for all firms traded on either the NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq 
that had primary SIC codes of 6XXX over the time period ranging from January 1973 to December 2001.  
We obtain monthly data (including dividends) from CRSP, resulting in a total of 513,194 observations of 
monthly equity returns.5  We define the catastrophic risk tail of the monthly return distribution to be those 
returns in the lowest 10% of each of the monthly cross sections of observations.  In this section, we 
perform our analysis on those lower tail observations only, thereby limiting our analysis to 51,319 
observations.  In Section 2, we estimate the entire distribution for financial institutions’ monthly equity 
returns. 
The effect of diversification in risk reduction is quite apparent in comparisons of the distribution 
of SIC codes in the lower tail of the return distribution to the entire distribution comprised of all monthly 
equity returns on financial institutions. Holding companies (SIC code 67, which includes bank holding 
companies and mutual funds) represent 48% of the entire sample, but only 39% of the observations in the 
lower return tail of equity returns.  Moreover, depository institutions (SIC code 60) have relatively less 
downside risk exposure than other financial institutions (comprising 20% of the lower tail observations, 
but 25% of the entire database), perhaps as a result of constraining banking regulations, such as minimum 
capital requirements, as well as access to the governmental safety net in the form of deposit insurance and 
lender of last resort privileges.  In contrast, nondepository credit institutions (SIC code 61) were more 
heavily represented in the lower tail of equity returns (comprising 9% of the observations) than in the 
entire sample (comprising 5% of the observations).  This may reflect the periodic upheavals in the 
mortgage banking business in the U.S.  Other classifications that experienced relatively greater amounts 
of downside risk over the sample period were real estate firms (SIC code 65, comprising 9% of the tail 
observations, but only 5% of the entire sample), security and commodity brokers (SIC code 62, 
comprising 6% of the tail observations, but only 3% of the entire sample) and insurance companies (SIC 
code 63, comprising 14% of the tail observations, but only 12% of the entire sample). 
                                                          
4 These lines of distinction have become somewhat blurred by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
which permits consolidation of banking, insurance and securities activities into a single financial holding company.  
In Section 3, we distinguish different types of financial intermediaries by their regulatory and market structure 
environments. 
5 To check for the possibility of window dressing of  quarter-end and year-end data, as found in Allen and Saunders 
(1992), we constructed our own monthly returns using mid-month to mid-month equity prices. Our results were 
quite similar to those obtained using CRSP monthly returns; therefore, we do not report them here. 
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1.2 GPD Methodology 
Extremes are generally defined as excesses over a high or low threshold, and can be modeled by 
the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) of Pickands (1975). This paper concentrates on the lower (left) 
tail of the return distribution, and obtains the extremes from the cross-section of stock returns for each 
month from January 1973 to December 2001.6 More specifically, extreme returns are measured by the 
10% left tail of the empirical distribution of stock returns r.  
Let us call f(r) the probability density function (pdf) and F(r) the cumulative distribution function 
(cdf) of r, which can take values between l and u.7 First, we choose a low threshold l so that all ri < l < 0 
are defined to be in the negative tail of the distribution, where r1, r2,…, rn are a sequence of stock returns. 
Then we denote the number of exceedances of l (or stock returns lower than l) by  
           Nu = card{i: i = 1,…, n, ri > n},    (1) 
and the corresponding excesses by M1, M2,…, uNM . The excess distribution function of r is given by: 
   Fl(y) = P(r – l ≥ y | r < l) = P(M ≥ y | r < l),   y ≤ 0   (2) 
Using the threshold l, we now define the probabilities associated with r: 
             P(r ≤ l) = F(l)      (3) 
           P(r ≤ l + y) = F(l + y)     (4) 
where y < 0 is an exceedence of the threshold l.  Finally, let Fl(y) be given by 
              
)(
)()()(
lF
ylFlFyFl
+−=     (5) 
We thus obtain the Fl(y), the conditional distribution of how extreme a ri is, given that it already qualifies 
as an extreme. Pickands (1975) shows that Fl(y) will be very close to the generalized Pareto distribution 
Gmin,ξ  in equation (6) if l is a low threshold: 
    
ξ
ξ σ
µξσµ
/1
min,  1),;(
−


 

 −+= MMG    (6) 
where µ, σ, and ξ are the location, scale, and shape parameters of the GPD, respectively. The shape 
parameter ξ, called the tail index, reflects the fatness of the distribution (i.e., the weight of the tails), 
                                                          
6 Campbell et al. (2001), Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003), and Bali et al. (2003) measure average stock risk and 
average idiosyncratic risk in each month as the cross-sectional equal-weighted and value-weighted average of the 
variances of all the stocks traded in that month. Similarly, we use the cross-section of stock returns to estimate value 
at risk for each month from January 1973 to December 2001. 
7 For example, a random variable distributed as the normal gives l = –∞  and u = +∞. 
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whereas the parameters of scale σ and of location µ represent the dispersion and average of the extremes, 
respectively.8 
Two parametric approaches are commonly used to estimate the extreme value distributions: (1) 
the maximum likelihood method which yields parameter estimators which are unbiased, asymptotically 
normal, and of minimum variance. (2) the regression method which provides a graphical method for 
determining the type of asymptotic distribution.9  In this paper the maximum likelihood method is used to 
estimate catastrophic and operational risk parameters.    
Suppose that the generalized extreme value distribution for the minima, Gmin(Φ; x), has a density 
function gmin(Φ; x), where Φ = (ξ, µ, σ) ∈ ℜ×ℜ ×ℜ+  consists of a shape parameter ξ, a location 
parameter µ and a scale parameter σ.  Then the likelihood function based on the data for the minimum 
variable MT = (M1, M2,…, MT)  is given by 
L(Φ; MT) = ∏
=
Φ
T
i
iMg
1
min );(     (7) 
Denote the log-likelihood function by l(Φ; MT) = ln L(Φ;MT). The maximum likelihood estimator 
(MLE) for Φ then equals 
           
^
 arg max ( ; )T il MΦ∈ ΘΦ = Φ      (8) 
where 
^ ^
1 2( , ,..., )T T TM M MΦ = Φ  maximizes l(Φ; MT) over an appropriate parameter space Θ. 
The generalized Pareto distribution presented in (6) has a density function for the minima, 


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which yields the log-likelihood function: 
∑
=
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ξσ   (10) 
Differentiating the log-likelihood function in (10) with respect to µ, σ, and ξ yields the first-order 
conditions of the maximization problem. Clearly, no explicit solution exists to these nonlinear equations, 
and thus numerical procedures or search algorithms are required.  
                                                          
8 The generalized Pareto distribution presented in equation (6) nests the standard Pareto distribution, the uniform 
distribution, and the standard exponential distribution. The shape parameter, ξ, determines the tail behavior of the 
distributions. For ξ > 0, the distribution has a polynomially decreasing tail (Pareto). For ξ = 0, the tail decreases 
exponentially (exponential). For ξ < 0, the distribution is short tailed (uniform). 
9 Details and presentation of alternative statistical estimation methods can be found in Leadbetter, Lindgren, and 
Rootzen (1983), Resnick (1987), Embrechts, Kluppelberg, and Mikosch (1997), Longin (1996), and Bali (2003). 
 6
Figures 1A, 1B, and 1C, respectively, present the location, scale, and shape parameter estimates 
(denoted µ-GPD, σ-GPD and ξ-GPD, respectively) from January 1973 to December 2001. For example, 
Figure 1A graphs the monthly mean of the GPD.  The lowest value of the location parameter of the 
catastrophic risk tail was –0.38 and was obtained in October 1987, the month of the market crash.  The 
highest monthly mean was 0.02 for January 1976, the start of the recovery from the deep 1974-1975 
recession. Tail variance (shown in Figure 1B) was minimized during February 1980 at 0.002504 (0.05004 
for standard deviation).  This coincides with the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) which lifted interest rate ceilings, increased deposit insurance 
coverage to $100,000, allowed banks to offer savings accounts paying market interest rates, expanded 
lending powers for thrift institutions, and set uniform reserve requirements for state and nationally 
chartered banks. The DIDMCA was heralded as a revolutionary improvement in the regulatory 
environment governing financial intermediation.  On the other hand, tail volatility was maximized for the 
December 1991 month with a variance of 0.16 (standard deviation of 0.40). This coincided with the 
implementation of Basel capital accords, the first risk-adjusted international bank capital requirements. 
Moreover, Figure 1C plots the monthly tail-thickness parameters which show that catastrophic risk is 
characterized by fat tails since the estimated shape parameters are positive in most cases. 
 
2. Estimating Catastrophic Risk Using the Skewed Generalized Error Distribution 
In Section 1, we focused on the lower tail of the return distribution.  That is, we defined catastrophic 
risk based on the lowest 10% of all monthly equity returns for financial institutions during any month 
over the period ranging from January 1973 to December 2001.  In this section, we investigate the shape of 
the entire return distribution.  Thus, the results obtained in Section 2 place catastrophic risk into the 
context of the entire probability distribution of monthly equity returns for financial intermediaries.  
Moreover, in this section, we compare the Value at Risk (VaR) measures obtained using the two different 
methodologies of Sections 1 and 2. 
In order to depict the range of all observed monthly equity returns, we must make some assumptions 
about the presumed shape of the equity return distribution.  We start with the simplest and most restrictive 
assumption – normality.  Then we proceed to a general distribution, the Skewed Generalized Error 
Distribution (SGED), thereby permitting the estimation of four distributional moments – mean, standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis. We submit these distributional assumptions to statistical tests 
(likelihood ratio test) of the null hypothesis (normality) against the SGED assumption. Monthly 
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likelihood ratio tests strongly reject the normality assumption at the 1% significance level for almost all 
months from January 1973 to December 2001.10   
 
2.1  The Properties of the Skewed Generalized Error Distribution (SGED) 
Subbotin (1923) introduces the Generalized Error Distribution (GED) as special cases of Laplace, 
normal, and uniform distributions. The symmetric GED density is given by equation (11): 
     [( 1) / ]
exp[( 1/ 2) | / | ]( )
2  (1/ )
v
t
v t v v
vf
v
εε +− Π= Π Γ                (11) 
where rt is the return at time t, σ
µε −= tt r  is the standardized return at time t,  )( 
0
1∫
+∞
−=Γ dxexa xa is the 
gamma function, 
2/1)/2(
)/3(
)/1(2 


Γ
Γ=Π
−
v
vv
, and v > 0 is the degrees of freedom or tail-thickness 
parameter. For v = 2, the GED yields the normal distribution, while for v = 1 it yields the Laplace or the 
double exponential distribution. If v < 2, the density has thicker tails than the normal, whereas for v > 2 it 
has thinner tails. 
The GED is used by Box and Tiao (1962) to model prior densities in Bayesian estimation, Nelson 
(1991) to model the distribution of stock market returns, and Hsieh (1989) to model the distribution of 
exchange rates. Bali and Theodossiou (2003) introduce an asymmetric (or skewed) version of the GED. 
The Skewed Generalized Error Distribution (SGED) adds an additional moment, skewness, to the GED 
formulation.  The probability density function for the SGED is 
[ ] 


 +−+−+−=
k
kkk rrsign
Ckrf δσµσθλδσµσλσµ )(1
1exp),,,;(        (12) 
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11 
2
−


Γ=
k
kC θ            (13) 
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2/12/1
)(31 −
−−


Γ

Γ= λθ S
kk
           (14) 
1)(  2 −= λλδ SA            (15) 
     222 431)( λλλ AS −+=            (16) 
                                                          
10 The likelihood ratio test results are available upon request. 
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where µ = E(r) and σ are the expected value and the standard deviation of return r, λ is a skewness 
parameter, sign is the sign function, and (.) Γ  is the gamma function. The scaling parameters k and λ 
obey the following constraints k > 0 and –1< λ < 1. The parameter k controls the height and tails of the 
density function and the skewness parameter λ controls the rate of descent of the density around the mode 
of r, where mode(r) = µ – δσ. In the case of positive skewness (λ > 0), the density function is skewed to 
the right. This is because for values of r < µ – δσ, the return variable r is weighted by a greater value than 
unity and for values of r > µ – δσ by a value less than unity. The opposite is true for negative λ. Note that 
λ and δ have the same sign, thus, in case of positive skewness (λ > 0), the mode(r) is less than the 
expected value of r. The parameter δ is Pearson’s skewness [µ – mode(r)]/σ = δ. 
 The SGED distribution reduces to the GED for λ = 0, the Laplace distribution for λ = 0 and k = 1, 
the normal distribution for λ = 0 and k = 2, and the uniform distribution for λ = 0 and k = ∞. 
 The SGED parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function of rt with respect 
to the parameters µ,σ, k, and λ: 
[ ]∑= 



+−+
+−−−=
n
t
k
t
k
t
kk rsign
r
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1lnln),,,( λδσµ
δσµ
σθσλσµ         (18) 
where C, θ, and δ are given by equations (13)-(15), sign is the sign of the residuals (rt – µ + δσ), n is the 
sample size, and ln is the natural logarithm. 
 
2.2 Catastrophic Value at Risk (VaR) Estimates Using the GPD and the SGED 
We estimate the entire return distribution under the two alternative assumptions – the normal and the 
SGED.  Figure 2 presents the monthly parameter estimates for the SGED consisting of four moments 
(mean plotted in Figure 2A, standard deviation in Figure 2B, skewness in Figure 2C and kurtosis in 
Figure 2D). 
The traditional VaR models assume that the probability distribution of log-price changes (log-
returns) is normal. However, our results reject that hypothesis. Thus, we must derive alternative VaR 
models based on the GPD and SGED parameters.  
In continuous time diffusion models, (log)-stock price movements are described by the following 
stochastic differential equation, 
     tttt dWdtPd σµ +=ln                        (19) 
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where Wt is a standard Wiener process with zero mean and variance of dt, µt and σt are the time-varying 
drift and diffusion parameters of the geometric Brownian motion. In discrete time, equation (19) yields a 
return process: 
tztRPP ttttt ∆+∆==−∆+ σµlnln                       (20) 
where ∆t is the length of time interval in which the discrete time data are recorded and tzWt ∆=∆  is 
the Wiener process with zero mean and variance of ∆t. 
The critical step in calculating VaR measures is the estimation of the threshold point defining 
what variation in returns rt is considered to be extreme. Let Φ be the probability that rt is less than the 
threshold ϑ.  That is, 
    Φ=



∆
∆−=<=<
t
tazr
t
t
t σ
µϑϑ Pr)Pr(           (21) 
where Pr(⋅) is the underlying probability distribution. In the traditional VaR model Φ=1%, a= –2.326,  
          ϑNormal = µt ∆t – 2.326 σt t∆ .          (22) 
 The risk manager, who has exposure to a risk factor rt, needs to know how much capital to put 
aside to cover at least the fraction 1–Φ of daily losses during a year. For this purpose, the risk manager 
must first determine a threshold ϑ so that the event (rt < ϑ) has a probability Φ under Pr(⋅). The standard 
approach does this by using an explicit distribution that is in general the normal distribution. An 
alternative approach is to use a cumulative probability distribution F(ϑ) based on one of the extreme 
value and flexible probability distributions, and then solve for ϑ to obtain the threshold, i.e., 
               ( )1 1 .Fϑ −= −Φ             (23) 
As shown in Bali (2003), the GPD distribution yields the following VaR threshold:11 
         


 −

 Φ

+=
−
1
ξ
ξ
σµϑ
n
N
GPD                       (24) 
where n and N are the number of extremes and the number of total data points, respectively. Once the 
location (µ), scale (σ), and shape (ξ) parameters of the GPD distribution are estimated one can find the 
VaR threshold, ϑGPD, based on the choice of confidence level (Φ).  
There is substantial empirical evidence that the distribution of stock returns shows high peaks, fat 
tails and more outliers on the left tail. To account for skewness and kurtosis in the data, we use the 
skewed generalized error distribution (SGED) that account for the non-normality of returns and relatively 
infrequent events. As presented in Bali and Theodossiou (2003), the VaR threshold is computed using 
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             tatSGED ∆+∆= σµϑ ,                      (25) 
where a is the cut-off for the standardized cdf associated with probability 1–Φ, i.e., F(a)=1–Φ, and µ and 
σ are the mean and standard deviation parameters of the SGED density. 
Using equations (24) and (25), we estimate the monthly Value at Risk (VaR) at the 99% confidence 
intervals (1% VaR) for the GPD and SGED parameters.  Figure 3 compares the VaR results by deducting 
the GPD estimate from the SGED estimate.  During the early period (1973-1983), the VaR estimates 
using the two methodologies appear to be quite similar.  However, as catastrophic risk increases 
(decreases in 1% VaR), the methodologies diverge in their estimates.  In general, the SGED methodology 
offers higher estimates of VaR, with prominent outliers in which the SGED VaR estimates are much 
lower than the GPD estimates.12  Thus, methodological differences appear to become more important 
during periods when accurate risk estimates are most crucial.  In Section 3, we incorporate a cyclical 
component into the value at risk estimates obtained using the two different methodologies. 
 
3. Measuring the Importance of Cyclical Factors in Catastrophic Risk Measures 
To test for cyclicality in the catastrophic risk measures defined in Sections 1 and 2, we gathered 
monthly data on macroeconomic, systemic risk, and regulatory factors from a wide variety of data 
sources.13 The variables can be broadly classified into seven categories: macroeconomic (including GDP, 
unemployment statistics, the University of Michigan survey on consumer sentiment, business 
bankruptcies, industrial production and NBER-marked recessions), foreign exchange rates (for the major 
currencies – the Japanese yen, the German mark and the British pound sterling in terms of US dollars),14 
equity market indices (for Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US), consumer price 
indices (for Japan, Germany, the UK and the US), interest rates (for long and short government bonds, 
Aaa-rated corporate bonds and Baa-rated corporate bonds), money supply figures (M2 for Japan, 
Germany, the EU, the UK and the US), and regulatory dummy variables (for the passage of the 
Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act in March 1980, the FDIC Improvement 
Act in December 1991, the first Basel Capital Accord in December 1992, the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 For alternative extreme value approaches to estimating VaR, see Longin (2000) and McNeil and Frey (2000). 
12 Comparisons using the 0.5% VaR and the 5% VaR yielded similar results to those shown in Figure 3. 
13 We measure the impact of economic and financial factors directly on monthly risk profiles.  In contrast, there is a 
literature that incorporates systemic risk considerations by altering the variance-covariance matrix underlying 
returns.  However, this may jeopardize the properties (e.g., invertibility) of the historical variance covariance 
matrix. See Kyle and Xiong (2001), Kodres and Pritzker (2002), Longin and Solnik (2001) and Rigobon and Forbes 
(2002). 
14 There were not enough monthly time series observations to use the Euro/US dollar exchange rate, adopted in 
January 1999, but we incorporate the Euro/US dollar exchange rate into the DM/US dollar exchange rate series after 
January 1999.  
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Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in September 1994, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 
November 1999).15  Panels A and B of Table 1 provide the source of data and the descriptive statistics for 
each of the 43 macroeconomic, cyclical factors. 
 
3.1 Modeling Cyclical Components in the Catastrophic Risk Measures 
We utilized the results from Sections 1 and 2 to test for cyclicality in our catastrophic risk measures.  
That is, in Section 1 we estimate catastrophic risk using Extreme Value Theory with the Generalized 
Pareto Distribution (GPD) for the lowest 10% of equity returns for financial institutions in each month of 
our sample period 1973-2001.  That analysis generates three catastrophic risk estimates: the location 
parameter (the mean of the extremes), the scale parameter (related to the standard deviation of the 
extremes) and the shape or tail thickness parameter (measuring kurtosis in the extremes).16  Hereinafter 
we denote these three risk measures respectively as µ-GPD, σ-GPD, and ξ-GPD.   
In Section 2, we represent the entire return distribution using the Skewed Generalized Error 
Distribution (SGED), after first rejecting the hypothesis of normality for almost all months in our sample.  
The SGED generates four parameter measures: mean, standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness, 
hereinafter denoted µ-SGED,σ-SGED, ξ-SGED, and λ-SGED, respectively. Using the derivations 
described in Section 2.2 for the GPD and SGED parameters, we define the Value at Risk (VaR) at the 1% 
level as VaR1%-GPD and VaR1%-SGED, respectively.   
We conducted the regression analysis using all 43 macroeconomic variables, but present only a 
representative subset in Tables 2A and 2B.17  The results are consistent with significant levels of 
procyclicality in catastrophic VaR.  For example, the positive and significant coefficients on the NBER 
                                                          
15 Although many other regulatory regime shifts occurred over the period 1973-2001, these five were viewed to be 
the most significant in terms of their impact on catastrophic risk in the financial services industry.  The DIDMCA 
removed interest rate ceilings on deposits, authorized interest-bearing checking accounts (NOW and MMDA 
accounts), introduced uniform reserve requirements, increased deposit insurance coverage and expanded thrift 
powers.  The FDICIA introduced prompt corrective action to require regulators to intervene when bank capital falls 
below certain thresholds, phased in risk-based deposit insurance premiums, limited “too big to fail” bailouts and 
forbearance by regulators, and extended federal regulation over foreign banks.  The Basel Capital Accord created an 
internationally level playing field of capital requirements that were risk-adjusted and that included a capital charge 
for off-balance sheet activities.  The Interstate Banking Act permitted bank holding companies to expand across 
state lines.  The GLBA removed the Glass-Steagall Act restrictions on consolidation of banking, insurance and 
securities activities into a single holding company, thereby creating the financial holding company structure. 
16 Bali and Neftci (2003) indicate that the mean of the GPD can be measured by the estimated µ-GPD location 
parameter. They also show that the kurtosis of the extremes is largely determined by the estimated ξ-GPD and the 
standard deviation is a function of both the σ-GPD and the ξ-GPD parameters.   
17 First, we run a univariate OLS regression for each of the 43 macroeconomic variables. Second, we compute the 
correlation coefficients for all independent variables. To alleviate the problem of multicollinearity in our regression 
analysis, we omit those variables that are highly correlated with the most consistently significant cyclical factors. 
The final regressions are run for a selected number of cyclical variables that have low correlations with other 
variables.   Results for the full panel of cyclical variables are available upon request. 
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dummy variable (equals 1 in recession, 0 otherwise) of 0.030 for VaR1%-GPD in Table 2A (significant at 
the 10% level) and 0.028 VaR1%-SGED in Table 2B (significant at the 5% level) suggest that 
catastrophic risk increases in recessions.  A similar interpretation can be applied to the VaR-regression 
coefficients on the index of US industrial production.  While the NBER recession dummy variable is a 
lagging indicator of economic conditions, the industry index is a leading indicator.  Peaks in the index 
indicate turning points in the business cycle.18  Thus, the positive coefficients on the industry index 
variable for the VaR regressions, 0.006 (significant at the 1% level) in Table 2A and 0.004 (significant at 
the 1% level) in Table 2B, are consistent with evidence of forward-looking procyclicality in catastrophic 
VaR.  Comparing Tables 2A and 2B shows the robustness of this result.  The relationships between both 
measures of 1% VaR and the macroeconomic variables are quite similar, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.   
 The procyclicality found in the catastrophic VaR is also evidenced in the distributional risk 
parameters.  For example, the negative and significant coefficients on the mean variables (µ-GPD in 
Table 2A and µ-SGED in Table 2B) are consistent with a negative (leftward) shift in the return 
distribution during economic downturns.   
 The regulatory environment also plays a role in determining the financial firms’ catastrophic risk 
exposures.  For example, implementation of the Basel Capital Accord in 1992 and passage of the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994 are consistent with a significant (at the 5% 
level or better) reduction in 1% VaR measured using both the GPD and the SGED approaches.  
Moreover, passage of the DIDMCA of 1980 significantly (at the 1% level) reduced VaR1%-GPD, but this 
was insignificant for VaR1%-SGED.  Moreover, the Japanese discount rate variable can be viewed as a 
proxy for easing/tightening of the environment of monetary and financial restrictions in Japan.  The 
period of a falling Japanese discount rate corresponds to a liberalization of the Japanese financial 
environment in the wake of the Big Bang decontrols and attempts to rescue the troubled Japanese banking 
system.  The positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficients on the RMBANK_a_JP for both 1% 
VaR regressions is consistent with an increase in catastrophic risk during this volatile period. 
 
 
4. Measuring Operational Risk 
Before we can estimate operational risk, we must first define it; something easier said than done.  
The definitions range from the very narrow (regulatory approach) to extremely broad classifications.  For 
example, Kingsley et al. (1998) define operational risk to be the “risk of loss caused by failures in 
                                                          
18 The industry index variable has a correlation of –0.19 (significant at the 1% level) with the NBER dummy 
variable. 
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operational processes or the systems that support them, including those adversely affecting reputation, 
legal enforcement of contracts and claims.” (page 3).  Often this definition includes both strategic risk and 
business risk.  That is, operational risk arises from breakdowns of people, processes and systems (usually, 
but not limited to technology) within the organization.  Strategic and business risk originate outside of the 
firm and emanate from external causes such as political upheavals, changes in regulatory or government 
policy, tax regime changes, mergers and acquisitions, changes in market conditions, etc.   
However, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision excludes strategic and business risk from 
the definition proposed in the New Capital Accord.  That is, BIS (September 2001) defines operational 
risk to be “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or 
from external events.” Explicitly excluded from this definition are systemic risk, strategic and 
reputational risks, as well as all indirect losses or opportunity costs, which may be open-ended and huge 
in size compared to direct losses.    
 We utilize the more expansive definition of operational risk.  Indeed, we define operational risk 
as a residual measure.  After all the identifiable sources of risk (credit risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate 
risk, equity price risk, etc.) are accounted for, the remainder is defined as operational risk.  This sidesteps 
the difficult problem of modeling business activities on a micro level.19      
We estimate the residual operational risk measure for each financial institution using a monthly 
time series over the period 1973-2001 for all firms in our sample with at least 100 monthly equity 
returns.20  For each of these firms, we estimated the following OLS regression:21 
ttttt rxr εβααα ++∆++∆+= −12222110 ...          (26) 
where rt and rt-1 are the monthly and 1-month lagged equity returns on each of the financial firms in our 
sample over the period t = March 1973 through December 2001;22 ∆xit, (i = 1, 2, …, 22), is the first order 
difference of the 22 variables used to estimate credit risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk and market 
risk.23  Nineteen of these variables are taken from the macro variables defined in Table 1 and are grouped 
by risk source as follows:24 
                                                          
19 Ebnother et al. (2003) perform a case study that expends considerable resources to model 103 production 
processes, but can only explain a small portion of the firm’s VaR, despite the high cost of defining and maintaining 
data about the operational processes. 
20 There were 38 firms with only 100 monthly observations.  The average number of months for any individual 
financial firm in our sample was 178.  The maximum number was 348 months over the entire sample period of 
January 1973 – December 2001. 
21 This model is the reduced form of a lagged regression model with an assumed one month lag. 
22 Because of the one month lag in equation (26), we could not estimate the model for the first quarter of 1973 and 
thus do not present results for January and February 1973. 
23 Each variable has 348 monthly observations over the sample period with the exception of RMGBS_a_UK (the 91 
day UK Treasury bill rate), which was missing for 3 months. 
24 The three firm specific credit risk measures are taken from quarterly Compustat.   
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Overall Credit Risk Measure: 
RAAA-RBBB = the spread between the AAA and the BBB corporate bond yield. 
 
Firm Specific Credit Risk Measures: 
Market value of equity/Book value of assets = 1 – leverage ratio. 
Net income/sales. 
Log of book value of total assets. 
 
Interest Rate Risk Measures: 
R_3MTB=3 month US Treasury bill rates. 
R_10YTB=10 year US Treasury bond rates. 
RM1B3S_a_UZ=3 month Euribor rates. 
RMGB10Y_a_GY=10 year German Treasury bond rates. 
RMBANK_a_JP=Discount rate in Japan. 
RMGBL_a_JP=Long Japanese bond rates. 
RMGBS_a_UK=91 day UK Treasury bill rates. 
RMGBL_a_UK=10 year UK Treasury bond rates. 
 
Exchange Rate Risk Measures: 
Exgeus=Deutschemark/US dollar exchange rate.25 
Exukus=British pound/US dollar exchange rate. 
Exjpus=Japanese yen/US dollar exchange rate. 
 
Market Risk Measures: 
FPS6CA=Equity Index Canada. 
FPS6FR=Equity Index France. 
FPS6IT=Equity Index Italy. 
FPS6JP=Equity Index Japan. 
FPS6UK=Equity Index UK. 
FPS6WG=Equity Index Germany. 
SPINDX=S&P 500 Index. 
 
 The residual term, εt,from equation (26), is the measure of operational risk used in this analysis.  
We have 122,377 observations with the number of firms in any month ranging from 111 to 521.26  A 
considerable portion of the raw returns for financial firms can be attributed to a return for operational risk 
exposure.  On average, the ratio of residual (operational risk) to total equity returns is 66%, with 
considerable monthly variance.27  This suggests that financial firms have become rather adept at hedging 
their market and even credit risk exposures, but that operational risk exposure has been left relatively 
                                                          
25 After January 1999, the DM/US dollar exchange rate was replaced by the euro/US dollar exchange rate by 
calculating an imputed DM/US dollar exchange rate as follows: (DM/euro as of December 1998) x (euro/US$ as of 
each month starting in January 1999) = imputed DM/US$ for each month in the sample period after the adoption of 
the euro. 
26 We obtained qualitatively similar results when we performed a similar analysis by estimating equation (26) 
omitting the COMPUSTAT firm specific measures of credit risk.  For that analysis, we had a total of 355,586 
(rather than 122,377) observations. 
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unmanaged. This may be the result of the lag in the development of operational risk measurement models, 
as well as the less developed state of the catastrophic and operational risk derivatives market.28 
In recent years, there has been an explosive growth in the use of derivatives.  For example, as of 
December 2000, the total (on-balance-sheet) assets for all US banks was $5 trillion and for Euro area 
banks over $13 trillion.  The value of non-government debt and bond markets worldwide was almost $12 
trillion.   In contrast, global derivatives markets exceeded $84 trillion in notional value [see Rule (2001)].  
BIS data show that the market for interest rate derivatives totaled $65 trillion (in terms of notional 
principal), foreign exchange rate derivatives exceeded $16 trillion and equities almost $2 trillion.29   The 
young and still growing credit derivatives market has been estimated at US$1 trillion as of June 2001. By 
comparison to these other derivatives markets, the market for operational risk derivatives is still in its 
infancy.     
Cat bonds are examples of derivatives used to hedge operational risk. The earliest cat bonds were 
typically linked to a single risk.  However, currently more than 65 percent of all new issues link payoffs 
to a portfolio of catastrophes.  During April 2000 to March 2001, 11 percent of all newly issued cat bonds 
had sublimits that limited the maximum compensation payment per type of risk or per single catastrophe 
within the portfolio.  Despite this limitation, the introduction of cat bonds allows access to a capital 
market that has the liquidity to absorb operational risk that is beyond the capacity of traditional insurance 
and self-insurance vehicles.  Since cat bonds are privately placed Rule 144A instruments, most investors 
are either mutual funds/investment advisors or proprietary/hedge funds, accounting for 50 percent of the 
market in terms of dollar commitments at the time of primary distribution [see Schochlin (2002)].  The 
remainder of the investors consisted of reinsurers/financial intermediaries (21 percent), banks (8 percent), 
non-life insurers (4 percent) and life insurers (17 percent of the new issues market).   
 In order to examine the distribution of operational risk across types of financial intermediaries, 
Figures 4A, 4B and 4C divide the sample of financial firms into three groups: depository institutions (SIC 
codes 60XX, 66XX and 6712), insurance companies (SIC codes 63XX and 64XX) and securities firms 
(all other 6XXX-level SIC codes).  In keeping with their roles as residual insurers of risk (e.g., as 
purchasers of cat bonds), Figure 4B shows that the insurance industry absorbed more operational risk than 
did securities firms over the 1973-2001 period.  The average ratio of residual to raw equity returns for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 The range of the ratios is not necessarily between 0 and 1 if, for example, the raw return for a particular monthly 
equity return is very small or negative whereas the 22 risk variables imply a high positive return, then the residual 
will be a large negative number, resulting in a ratio with absolute value exceeding one. 
28 For a discussion of the state of the art in operational risk measurement and management using derivatives, see 
chapter 5 of Allen, Boudoukh and Saunders (2003). 
29 Comprehensive global data on the size of OTC derivatives markets do not exist. Rule (2001) estimates the size of 
the market using Office of the Comptroller of the Currency data showing that US commercial banks held $352 
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insurance companies is 66.8% as compared to 64.7% for securities firms.  In contrast, depository 
institutions (Figure 4A) have an average ratio of residual to raw equity returns of 68.4%. This is 
consistent with moral hazard implications of the government safety net that may induce banks to take on 
additional risk exposures.  However, the standard deviation of the monthly operational risk ratio was 
lowest for depository institutions.  The standard deviation for securities firms was 9.0%, the standard 
deviation for insurance companies was 7.0% and for banks only 5.6%.  Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C show that 
securities firms experienced large operational risk losses during the market crashes of 1987 and 2000.  
However, the greatest volatility in the operational risk ratio was for insurance companies, consistent with 
their roles as net insurers of operational risk.      
We use the monthly residual operational risk measures derived from equation (26) to re-estimate 
the tails of the loss distribution.  Operational risk events can be divided into high frequency/low severity 
(HFLS) events that occur regularly, in which each event individually exposes the firm to low levels of 
losses.  In contrast, low frequency/high severity (LFHS) operational risk events are quite rare, but the 
losses to the organization are enormous upon occurrence.  An operational risk measurement model must 
incorporate both HFLS and LFHS risk events.  There is an inverse relationship between frequency and 
severity so that high severity risk events are quite rare, whereas low severity risk events occur rather 
frequently.  In the next sections, we utilize both the GPD and the SGED models (described in Sections 1 
and 2) to examine the tails of our derived operational risk measures. 
 
4.1 Operational Risk – The GPD Approach 
We use the methodology presented in Section 1.2 to re-estimate the three GPD location, scale and 
tail thickness parameters (denoted µ-ORGPD, σ-ORGPD, and ξ-ORGPD, respectively) using the 
operational risk residuals and then use the methodology in Section 2.2 to define the GPD operational 
Value at Risk (VaR) at the 1% level, denoted VaR1%-ORGPD.  Figure 5 compares the 1% operational 
VaR measures using the GPD to the catastrophic 1% VaR measures using the GPD (as calculated in 
Section 2.2).  The plot of the monthly VaR shows that the operational risk VaR measures are less negative 
(have lower loss levels) than the VaR measures obtained for catastrophic risk for most months in the 
sample period from 1973-2001.   Indeed, on average, the 1% VaR operational loss level is 2.4% less than 
the 1% VaR catastrophic loss level.  However, there are instances in which the residual VaR loss levels 
exceed the catastrophic risk VaR exposures (i.e., the comparison value is negative).  Although this was 
most pronounced during January 1975, when the operational VaR loss levels exceeded the catastrophic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
billion notional credit derivatives outstanding on March 31, 2001 pro-rated for US banks’ share using a British 
Bankers Association Survey showing that the global market totaled $514 billion in 1999.  
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VaR levels by their greatest amounts (over 18% for all VaR measures), it occurred intermittently 
throughout the sample period.   
 
 
4.2 Extreme Operational Risk – The SGED Approach 
Using the monthly residual operational risk measures, we re-estimate the SGED using the 
methodology described in Section 2 for operational risk, thereby generating four parameter measures: 
mean, standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness for operational risk (denoted µ-ORSGED,σ-ORSGED, ξ-
ORSGED, and λ-ORSGED, respectively). Using these parameter values, we then estimate the monthly 
1% VaR (denoted VaR1%-ORSGED), shown in Figure 6 compared to the catastrophic risk VaR1%-SGED 
estimated in Section 2.2.  Figure 6 shows that the operational risk VaR measures are less negative (have 
lower loss levels) than the catastrophic VaR measures obtained using raw returns.   Indeed, on average, 
the 1% VaR operational loss level is 2.5% less than the 1% VaR catastrophic loss level.30   These results 
are quite similar to those obtained using the GPD methodology described in Figure 5 above.  Moreover, 
as for the VaR1%-GPD results, there are instances in which the SGED operational VaR level exceeds the 
SGED catastrophic VaR level, although the order of magnitude is less than observed for the GPD 
estimates of operational VaR levels. 
 Results from both the GPD and the SGED methodologies suggest that financial intermediaries are 
exposed to considerable amounts of residual operational risk. Operational risk management presents 
extremely difficult risk control challenges when compared to the management of other sources of risk 
exposure, such as market risk, liquidity risk and credit risk.  The internal nature of the exposure makes 
both measurement and management difficult.  Young (1999) states that “open socio-technical systems 
have an infinite number of ways of failing….The complexity of human behavior prevents errors from 
being pre-specified and reduced to a simple numerical representation” (p. 10).  Operational risk is 
embedded in a firm and cannot be easily separated out.  Thus, even if a hedge performs as designed, the 
firm will be negatively affected in terms of damage to reputation or disruption of business as a result of a 
low frequency, high severity operational risk event. 
 
5. Cyclicality in Operational Risk Measures 
 In Section 4, we derived a residual measure of operational risk.  In this section, we investigate the 
cyclical components of our operational risk measure.  We examine the relationship between the 
operational risk measures and the cyclical factors presented in Table 1, which consist of monthly data on 
                                                          
30 Similar results are obtained for 0.5%, 1.5%, 2%, and 2.5% catastrophic and operational VaR levels. 
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macroeconomic, cyclical, systemic risk, and regulatory factors.  To replicate the regression analysis used 
for catastrophic risk on operational risk, we follow the methodology outlined in Section 3.1.  Tables 3A 
and 3B present the regression results for a representative sample of macroeconomic variables using all 
seven of the GPD operational risk parameters and the SGED operational risk parameters, as well as the 
operational value at risk measures VaR1%-ORGPD and VaR1%-ORSGED.31   
 The results presented in Tables 3A and 3B again display considerable consistency across the GPD 
and SGED methodologies.  Coefficients are similar in size, sign and statistical significance.  There is also 
evidence of procyclicality in the operational value at risk measures.  Although the NBER recession 
dummy variable is not statistically significant, the coefficient on the index of US industrial production is 
positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) for both the VaR1%-ORGPD and VaR1%-
ORSGED regressions (0.003 in Table 3A using the GPD methodology and 0.001 in Table 3B using the 
SGED methodology).  Moreover, the coefficient on the 3 month US Treasury bill rate level (R_3MTB) is 
significantly (at the 1% level) negative for both the VaR1%-ORGPD and VaR1%-ORSGED regressions.  
This suggests that operational value at risk declines during the periods of a relatively tight monetary 
policy consistent with an overheated economy.  Similarly, during periods of an easy monetary policy, 
generally coincident with economic downturns, the operational value at risk (VaR1%-ORGPD and 
VaR1%-ORSGED) increases. 
The regulatory environment also impacts operational value at risk.  As for catastrophic value at 
risk, the results in Tables 3A and 3B are consistent with significant (at the 5% level) decreases in 
operational value at risk following the implementation of the Basel Capital Accord in 1992 and the 
passage of the Interstate Banking Act in 1994.   
 Examining the individual risk parameters in Tables 3A and 3B provides additional evidence of 
procyclicality in operational risk exposures.  The coefficients on the NBER recession dummy variable for 
the mean regressions (µ-ORGPD in Table 3A and µ-ORSGED in Table 3B) are significantly (at the 5% 
level) negative, suggesting that there is a negative (downward) shift in mean operational risk measures 
during economic recessions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We examine the catastrophic risk of financial institutions and test for procyclicality.  We utilize 
an extreme value approach (Generalized Pareto Distribution, GPD), as well as a generalized distributional 
approach (Skewed Generalized Error Distribution, SGED) to obtain estimates of catastrophic risk 
                                                          
31 Before we measure cyclicality in operational risk measures using a series of OLS regressions, the same 
methodology described in footnote 17 is used to select the relevant macroeconomics variables associated with 
business cycle fluctuations. 
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parameters and 1% value at risk (VaR). We find evidence of procyclicality in the catastrophic VaR for 
financial institutions. 
We define a new, residual operational risk measure and estimate the risk parameters using both 
the GPD and the SGED.  We use these operational risk parameters to solve for the 1% operational VaR.  
Using our measure, we find that operational risk is quite significant, comprising approximately two thirds 
of the total equity returns of financial institutions.  This paper presents the first evidence of procyclicality 
in operational risk measures. 
Results are consistent across methodologies for both catastrophic and operational risk measures.  
Thus, we conclude that macroeconomic, systematic and environmental factors play a considerable role in 
influencing the risk of financial institutions.  Models that ignore these factors are therefore fundamentally 
flawed.  These results provide encouragement for further research into both catastrophic and operational 
risk measures that are conditioned on cyclical factors. 
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Figure 1A. Location Parameter of the GPD (January 1973 - December 2001)
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Figure 1B. Scale Parameter of the GPD (January 1973-December 2001)
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Figure 1C.  Shape Parameter of the GPD (January 1973-December 2001)
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Figure 2A. Mean Parameter of the SGED (January 1973 - December 2001)
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Figure 2B. Standard Deviation Parameter of the SGED (January 1973-December 2001)
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Figure 2C.  Skewness Parameter of the SGED (January 1973-December 2001)
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Figure 2D. Tail-Thickness Parameter of the SGED (January 1973-December 2001)
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Figure 3A. 1% Catastrophic VaR Estimates of GPD and SGED
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Figure 3B.  Differences in 1% Catastrophic VaR Estimates: SGED minus GPD
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Ja
n-
73
Ja
n-
74
Ja
n-
75
Ja
n-
76
Ja
n-
77
Ja
n-
78
Ja
n-
79
Ja
n-
80
Ja
n-
81
Ja
n-
82
Ja
n-
83
Ja
n-
84
Ja
n-
85
Ja
n-
86
Ja
n-
87
Ja
n-
88
Ja
n-
89
Ja
n-
90
Ja
n-
91
Ja
n-
92
Ja
n-
93
Ja
n-
94
Ja
n-
95
Ja
n-
96
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
98
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
00
Ja
n-
01
date
Va
R
1%
-S
G
ED
  m
in
us
 V
aR
1%
-G
PD
 
 26
Table 1 
Panel A.  Sources of Data on Cyclical Factors 
 
Variable  
Name 
Variable 
Description Data Source 
Number 
of Obs. Data Range 
Consentiment Consumer Sentiment 
University of Mich 
 
Economagic 
 
348 
 
1973-2001 
USunempl US Unemployment 
Rate 
Bureau of Labor Statistics  
348 
 
1973-2001 
RsvAst Aggregate Bank 
Reserve to Assets 
Federal Reserve Bank 
Kansas City 
 
264 
 
1980-2001 
BusBnkrpcy No. of US Business 
Bankruptcies 
Administrative Office of 
Courts 
 
264 
 
1980-2001 
IndstryIndex US Industrial 
Production 
Global Insight (DRI)  
348 
 
1973-2001 
exgeus Dmark/US$ FX Rate WRDS FX File 312 1973-1998 
exukus UK/US$ FX Rate WRDS FX File 348 1973-2001 
exjpus JP/US$ FX Rate WRDS FX File 348 1973-2001 
FPS6CA Equity Index Canada DRI 348 1973-2001 
FPS6FR Equity Index France DRI 348 1973-2001 
FPS6IT Equity Index Italy DRI 348 1973-2001 
FPS6JP Equity Index Japan DRI 348 1973-2001 
FPS6UK Equity Index UK DRI 348 1973-2001 
FPS6WG Equity Ind.Germany DRI 348 1973-2001 
SPINDX S&P 500 Index CRSP Indices 348 1973-2001 
CPI_JP CPI Japan Eurostat 275 1978-2000 
CPI_UK CPI UK Eurostat 336 1973-2000 
CPI_US CPI US Bureau of Labor Statistics 336 1973-2000 
CPI_G CPI Germany Eurostat 336 1973-2000 
R_3MTB 3 month US T-bills Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis - FRED 
348 1973-2001 
R_10YTB 10 yr US T-bonds FRED 348 1973-2001 
R_AAA AAA bond rate FRED 348 1973-2001 
R_Baa Baa bond rate FRED 348 1973-2001 
RMIB3S_a_UZ 3 mo.Euribor rate DRI 348 1973-2001 
RMGB10Y_a_GY 10 yr German T-bond DRI 348 1973-2001 
RMBANK_a_JP Discount rate Japan DRI 348 1973-2001 
RMGBL_a_JP Long Japanese bond DRI 348 1973-2001 
RMGBS_a_UK 91 day UK T-bill DRI 345 1973-2001 
RMGBL_a_UK 10 yr UK T-bond DRI 348 1973-2001 
M2SL US M2 money supply FRED 348 1973-2001 
M2_a_JP JP M2 money supply DRI 348 1973-2001 
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Variable  
Name 
Variable 
Description Data Source 
Number 
of Obs. Data Range 
M2NS_a_GY German M2 money DRI 264 1980-2001 
M2_a_UK UK M2 money DRI 235 1982-2001 
M2_a_UZ EU M2 Money DRI 264 1980-2001 
JM2_a_UZ M2 Index Eurozone DRI 264 1980-2001 
GDP_US 
US GDP Bureau Economic 
Analysis 
 
348 
 
1973-2001 
DUM_DIDMCA Depository Institution 
Deregulatory and 
Monetary Control Act 
dummy variable 
 
 
constructed 
 
 
348 
 
 
1973-2001 
DUM_FDICIA FDIC Improvement 
Act dummy variable 
 
constructed 
 
348 
 
1973-2001 
DUM_Basel Implementation of 
Basel I dummy var. 
 
constructed 
 
348 
 
1973-2001 
DUM_Interstate Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking & Branching 
Efficiency Act var. 
 
constructed 
 
348 
 
1973-2001 
DUM_GLBA Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act dummy var. 
 
constructed 
 
348 
 
1973-2001 
DUM_NBER Recessions as marked 
by NBER dummy var 
 
NBER website 
 
348 
 
1973-2001 
RegDum 
=1 for the first month 
of each of the 5 reg. 
changes above: 
DIDMCA, FDICIA, 
Basel, Interstate, and 
GLBA; 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
constructed 
 
 
 
348 
 
 
 
1973-2001 
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Panel B.  Descriptive Statistics for Cyclical Factors 
 
 
Variable  
Name 
 
Variable 
Description Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
Consentiment Consumer Sentiment 
University of Mich 
85.92 13.29 89.3 51.7 112 
USunempl US Unempl. Rate 6.37% 1.48% 6.15% 3.8% 10.8% 
RsvAst Aggregate Bank 
Reserve to Assets 
1.12% 0.37% 1.08% 0.54% 1.64% 
BusBnkrpcy No. of US Business 
Bankruptcies 
4870 1191 4846 2577 9534 
IndstryIndex US Industrial 
Production 
96.90 23.09 93.44 61.34 147.19 
exgeus Dmark/US$ FX Rate DM 2.05/US$ DM 0.46 DM 1.87/US$ DM 1.38/US$ DM 3.30/US$ 
exukus UK/US$ FX Rate £0.59/US$ £0.10 £0.60/US$ £0.39/US$ £0.92/US$ 
exjpus JP/US$ FX Rate ¥181.41/US$ ¥68 ¥152.37/US$ ¥83.69/US$ ¥305.67/US$ 
FPS6CA Equity Index Canada 101.72 65.24 92.4 25 328.8 
FPS6FR Equity Index France 88.88 85.40 71.35 11.1 364.5 
FPS6IT Equity Index Italy 85.56 78.28 78.35 8.7 330.7 
FPS6JP Equity Index Japan 50.10 28.85 48.6 12.2 135 
FPS6UK Equity Index UK 99.50 83.67 84.05 6.2 299.5 
FPS6WG Equity Index 
Germany 
108.85 105.65 77.15 22.3 452 
SPINDX S&P 500 Index 408.21 392.72 261.43 63.54 1517.68 
CPI_JP CPI Japan 103.68 11.67 104 76.09 118.2 
CPI_UK CPI UK 106.92 48.04 105.51 23.93 182 
CPI_US CPI US 103.63 36.34 103.08 39.63 161.8 
CPI_G CPI Germany 100.08 22.11 100.2 58.02 134.8 
R_3MTB 3 month US T-bills 6.69% 2.69% 5.93% 1.69% 16.3% 
R_10YTB 10 yr US T-bonds 8.24% 2.36% 7.76% 4.53% 15.32% 
R_AAA AAA bond rate 9.14% 2.09% 8.65% 6.22% 15.49% 
R_Baa Baa bond rate 10.23% 2.46% 9.75% 7.09% 17.18% 
RMIB3S_a_UZ 3 mo.Euribor rate 8.63%  3.32% 8.54% 2.57% 18.92% 
RMGB10Y_a_G
Y  
10 yr German T-
bond 
7.25% 1.58% 7.18% 3.65% 10.83% 
RMBANK_a_JP Discount rate Japan 3.88% 2.56% 3.88% 0.1% 9% 
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Variable  
Name 
 
Variable 
Description Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
RMGBL_a_JP Long Japanese bond  5.55% 2.35% 6.18% 0.82% 8.89% 
RMGBS_a_UK 91 day UK gov 9.56% 3.22% 9.61% 3.89% 16.97% 
RMGBL_a_UK   10 yr UK gov 10.02% 2.93% 10.02% 4.25% 16.34% 
M2SL US M2  $2682.54 b $1238.50 b $2782.14 b $810.17 b $5444.44 b 
M2_a_JP JP M2  ¥363,836 b ¥181,964 b ¥353,573 b ¥82,303 b ¥656,794 b 
M2NS_a_GY German M2  DM1529.35 b DM626.18 b DM1498.85 b DM679.4 b DM2673.62 b 
M2_a_UK UK M2 money  £345.41 b £148.75 b £338.88 b £114.60 b £646.20 b 
M2_a_UZ EU M2 Money EU2600.86 b EU 991.67 b EU2579.58 b EU1071.05 b EU4598.9 b 
JM2_a_UZ M2 Index EU 0.58 0.21 0.57 0.25 0.99 
GDP_US US GDP $1691.94 b $879.66 b $1577.67 b $446.13 b $3384.31 b 
DUM_DIDMCA DIDMCA dummy 
var. 
0.75   0 1 
DUM_FDICIA FDICIA dummy var. 0.35   0 1 
DUM_Basel Implementation of 
Basel I var. 
0.31   0 1 
DUM_Interstate Riegle-Neal dummy 
var. 
0.25   0 1 
DUM_GLBA Gramm-Leach-
Bliley dummy  
0.07   0 1 
DUM_NBER NBER recessions  
var 
0.17   0 1 
RegDum New regs var. 0.01   0 1 
 
 
        Notes:  The last column represents the frequency of significance of each variable in the stepwise OLS regressions on the various risk measures.  A variable  
        is included in the regression if its coefficient has a significance level of 10% or better.  Regression results are presented in Tables 4a-k. 
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Table 2A. Regression Results from Catastrophic Risk Estimates of GPD  
The full model is: Risk Factor Variablet = αt + β1,tI1,t + … +βn,,tIn,,t +εt where I1,t…In,t are the cyclical factor 
variables listed in Table 1, n=1,…43, t=January 1973…December 2001.  We present only a representative number 
of the cyclical factor variables in the table.   The Risk Factor Variablet takes the value of the location, scale and tail 
thickness parameters of the GPD (µ-GPD, σ-GPD, and ξ-GPD, respectively) and the VaR1%-GPD catastrophic 
value at risk.  Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, 
respectively. 
 
Variable Name Location µ-GPD 
Scale 
 σ-GPD 
Tail Thickness 
ξ-GPD 
Value at Risk 
VaR1%-GPD 
Intercept Term 0.227*** 
(0.075) 
-0.070 
(0.048) 
-0.299 
(0.534) 
0.412*** 
(0.106) 
Consentiment -0.0008** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.0009 
(0.0006) 
IndstryIndex -0.003*** 
(0.0008) 
0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
SPINDX 0.00004 
(0.00003) 
-0.000002 
(0.00002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.00006 
(0.00005) 
R_3MTB -0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.041*** 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
RM1B3S_a_UZ 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.016) 
-0.0004 
(0.003) 
RMBANK_a_JP 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
RMGBS_a_UK 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.032** 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
DUM_DIDMCA 0.021** 
(0.011) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.100 
(0.077) 
0.047*** 
(0.015) 
DUM_FDICIA -0.015 
(0.019) 
0.0009 
(0.012) 
-0.036 
(0.138) 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
DUM_Basel 0.030 
(0.018) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
0.032 
(0.131) 
0.056** 
(0.026) 
DUM_Interstate 0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
0.090 
(0.115) 
0.071*** 
(0.023) 
DUM_GLBA 0.0003 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.109) 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
DUM_NBER -0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.078) 
-0.030* 
(0.016) 
Adj. R-square 9.63% 10.89% 6.81 % 31.85% 
# observations 342 342 342 342 
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Table 2B. Regression Results from Catastrophic Risk Estimates of SGED  
The full model is: Risk Factor Variablet = αt + β1,tI1,t + … +βn,,tIn,,t +εt where I1,t…In,t are the cyclical factor 
variables listed in Table 1, n=1,…43, t=January 1973…December 2001.  We present only a representative number 
of the cyclical factor variables in the table.   The Risk Factor Variablet takes the value of the mean, standard 
deviation, kurtosis  and skewness parameters of the SGED (µ-SGED, σ-SGED,ξ-SGED, and λ-SGED respectively) 
and the VaR1%-SGED catastrophic value at risk.  Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 
10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Variable Name Mean µ-SGED 
Std. Dev. 
σ-SGED 
Kurtosis 
ξ-SGED 
Skewness 
λ-SGED 
Value at Risk 
VaR1%-SGED
Intercept Term 0.297*** 
(0.074) 
0.071*** 
(0.027) 
1.541*** 
(0.348) 
1.059*** 
(0.242) 
0.199** 
(0.085) 
Consentiment -0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
IndstryIndex -0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004*** 
(0.0009) 
SPINDX 0.00009*** 
(0.00003) 
0.00006*** 
(0.00001) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00001 
(0.00004) 
R_3MTB -0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0007) 
0.042*** 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
RM1B3S_a_UZ 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.0009 
(0.0008) 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
RMBANK_a_JP 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.040** 
(0.016) 
-0.030*** 
(0.011) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
RMGBS_a_UK 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.0006) 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
DUM_DIDMCA 0.039*** 
(0.011) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.089* 
(0.050) 
0.096*** 
(0.036) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
DUM_FDICIA -0.021 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
0.023 
(0.090) 
-0.043 
(0.063) 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
DUM_Basel 0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.019 
(0.086) 
0.094 
(0.059) 
0.049** 
(0.021) 
DUM_Interstate 0.031* 
(0.016) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.046 
(0.075) 
0.027 
(0.052) 
0.061*** 
(0.018) 
DUM_GLBA 0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.014 
(0.071) 
-0.048 
(0.049) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
DUM_NBER -0.030*** 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.0004) 
0.111** 
(0.051) 
-0.093*** 
(0.035) 
-0.027** 
(0.012) 
Adj. R-square 4.68% 46.40% 29.62% 4.83 % 32.53% 
# observations 342 342 342 342 342 
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Figure 4A. Ratio of Operational Risk to Total Return: Depository Financial Intermediaries
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Figure 4B. Ratio of Operational Risk to Total Return: Insurance Financial Intermediaries
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Figure 4C.Ratio of Operational Risk to Total Return: Securities and Other Financial Intermediaries
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Figure 5. Catastrophic and Operational 1% VaR Estimates of GPD
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Figure 6. Catastrophic and Operational 1% VaR Estimates of SGED
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Table 3A. Regression Results from Operational Risk Estimates of GPD  
The full model is: OR-Risk Factor Variablet = αt + β1,tI1,t + … +βn,,tIn,,t +εt where I1,t…In,t are the cyclical factor 
variables listed in Table 1, n=1,…43, t=January 1973…December 2001.  We present only a representative number 
of the cyclical factor variables in the table.   The OR-Risk Factor Variablet takes the value of the location, scale and 
tail thickness parameters of the GPD estimated using the residual operational risk measure (µ-ORGPD, σ-ORGPD, 
and ξ-ORGPD, respectively) and the VaR1%-ORGPD operational value at risk.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Variable Name Location µ-ORGPD 
Scale 
 σ-ORGPD 
Tail Thickness 
ξ-ORGPD 
Value at Risk 
VaR1%-ORGPD 
Intercept Term 0.002 
(0.052) 
0.044 
(0.044) 
-0.553 
(0.568) 
0.049 
(0.084) 
Consentiment -0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.00007 
(0.0005) 
IndstryIndex -0.0006 
(0.0006) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0009) 
SPINDX -0.00002 
(0.00002) 
0.00003 
(0.00002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.00004 
(0.00004) 
R_3MTB 0.0009 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.023 
(0.014) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
RM1B3S_a_UZ 0.0002 
(0.002) 
-0.0009 
(0.001) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
-0.0005 
(0.002) 
RMBANK_a_JP 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.016 
(0.026) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
RMGBS_a_UK 
0.0005 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.033** 
(0.014) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
DUM_DIDMCA -0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.013 
(0.082) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
DUM_FDICIA -0.002 
(0.013) 
0.0008 
(0.011) 
0.050 
(0.147) 
-0.002 
(0.022) 
DUM_Basel 0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
0.116 
(0.140) 
0.042** 
(0.021) 
DUM_Interstate 0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.122) 
0.034* 
(0.018) 
DUM_GLBA 0.011 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
0.101 
(0.116) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
DUM_NBER -0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.065 
(0.083) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
Adj. R-square 5.99% 4.54% 4.87 % 28.49% 
# observations 342 342 342 342 
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Table 3B. Regression Results from Operational Risk Estimates of SGED  
The full model is: OR-Risk Factor Variablet = αt + β1,tI1,t + … +βn,,tIn,,t +εt where I1,t…In,t are the cyclical factor 
variables listed in Table 1, n=1,…43, t=January 1973…December 2001.  We present only a representative number 
of the cyclical factor variables in the table.   The OR-Risk Factor Variablet takes the value of the mean, standard 
deviation, kurtosis  and skewness parameters of the SGED estimated using the residual operational risk measure (µ-
ORSGED, σ-ORSGED,ξ-ORSGED, and λ-ORSGED respectively) and the VaR1%-ORSGED catastrophic value at 
risk.  Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Variable Name Mean µ-SGED 
Std. Dev. 
σ-SGED 
Kurtosis 
ξ-SGED 
Skewness 
λ-SGED 
Value at Risk 
VaR1%-SGED
Intercept Term 0.072 
(0.048) 
0.080*** 
(0.021) 
1.630*** 
(0.342) 
0.828*** 
(0.218) 
-0.073 
(0.062) 
Consentiment -0.0006** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
IndstryIndex -0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001** 
(0.0007) 
SPINDX 0.00002 
(0.00002) 
0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00007** 
(0.00003) 
R_3MTB -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0006) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
RM1B3S_a_UZ 0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.0005 
(0.002) 
RMBANK_a_JP 
-0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.038** 
(0.015) 
-0.034*** 
(0.010) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
RMGBS_a_UK 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
DUM_DIDMCA 0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.077 
(0.050) 
0.059* 
(0.032 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
DUM_FDICIA -0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.089) 
-0.061 
(0.057) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
DUM_Basel 0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.0008 
(0.084) 
0.053 
(0.054) 
0.031** 
(0.015) 
DUM_Interstate 0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.009** 
(0.006) 
0.033 
(0.073) 
0.027 
(0.047) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
DUM_GLBA 0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.038 
(0.070) 
-0.037 
(0.045) 
0.021* 
(0.013) 
DUM_NBER -0.018** 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.095* 
(0.050) 
-0.044 
(0.032) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
Adj. R-square 0.01% 42.13% 31.11% 2.89 % 29.95% 
# observations 342 342 342 342 342 
 
 
